This paper aims to shed light on a fundamental relationship between living and computational systems by elucidating the close similarity of self-replication of von Neumann's universal constructors to circular computational processes of universal computers that appear in Turing's original proof of the undecidability of the halting problem. The result indicates the possibility of reinterpreting self-replicating organisms as attempting to solve the halting problem in the context of construction. This attempt will never be completed because of the undecidability of the problem, which may account for why life can maintain its reproductive activity for an indefinitely long period of time.
3. Attach one copy of I(X) to X and separate X + I(X) from the rest.
The functions of these parts are symbolically written as Figure 1 illustrates these notations visually. Alan Turing's preceding work on computationally universal machines [6] gave a hint for von Neumann to develop these formulations of self-reproducing automata, especially on the idea of universal constructor A. These two kinds of machines apparently share a similar concept that a universal machine, given an appropriate finite description, can execute arbitrary tasks specified in the description. We should note however, that this similarity has often been overstated in the literature, leading to some misunderstandings of von Neumann's original intention, recently argued by McMullin [7, 5] . The most significant difference between these two types of universal machines is that the constructional machine must be made of the same parts that it operates on, and therefore both the machine and the parts must be embedded in the same space-time and obey the same "physical" rules, while the computational machine can be separate from the symbols it operates on, like the Turing machine's head that exists outside its tape. Another equally important difference is that the computational universality is defined by the ability of simulating the behavior of all the other computers, while the constructional universality is defined by the ability of constructing all the structures in a given product set, which has nothing to do with the ability of simulating the behavior of other constructors. The latter issue will be revisited later.
The aforementioned differences suggest the need for a distinct domain of research specially dedicated to the issues of machine construction, pioneered by von Neumann's work on constructional machines but since left unnamed to date. This would be closely related to computation theory pio-neered by Turing's work, but should be unique by involving physical interpretation and implementation of production processes and thereby connecting logic and mathematics to biology and engineering. Here I propose to call it construction theory, a domain of research that focuses on the theoretical aspects of productive behaviors of natural or artificial systems, including self-replication, self-repair and other epigenetic processes. There is a recent resurgence of studies on these topics in artificial life and other related fields [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] . Like in computation theory, there are many important problems yet to be addressed in construction theory, such as identifying the class of constructible structures given a set of physical rules, and determining whether there is a single truly universal construction model that could emulate any other construction models.
In the rest of this paper, we will focus on one particular question regarding the relationship between computation and construction theories. While von Neumann's universal constructor holds a close similarity to Turing's universal computer, little attention has been paid to what the entire self-replicating automaton D in construction theory would parallel in computation theory. Besides the universal constructor A, the automaton D also includes B that duplicates a given tape and C that attaches a copy of the duplicated tapes to the product of A. They are the subsystems that von Neumann added to the automaton in view of self-replication (and subsequent evolutionary processes). Their counterparts are not present in the design of Turing machines, and therefore, the entire architecture of self-reproducing automata has often been considered as if it were a heuristic design meaningful only on the construction side, but not on the computation side.
Here I would like to point out that self-replication in construction theory actually has a fundamental relationship with the halting problem in computation theory. Specifically, self-replication of von Neumann's universal constructors has its mathematical description in the identical form as that of circular computational processes of universal computers that appear in Turing's original proof of the undecidability of the halting problem. This leads us to a new interpretation of self-replicating organisms as attempting to solve the undecidable halting problem, not in computation theory but in the context of von Neumann's construction theory. This attempt, of course, will never be completed in a finite time because of the undecidability of the problem, but this very fact may account for why life can maintain its reproductive activity for an indefinitely long period of time.
A ONE-PAGE SUMMARY OF THE HALTING PROBLEM
The halting problem is a well-known decision problem in theoretical computer science that can be informally described as follows:
Given a description of a computer program and an initial input it receives, determine whether the program eventually finishes computation and halts on that input.
This problem has been one of the most profound issues in computation theory since 1936 when Turing proved that no general algorithm exists to solve this problem for any arbitrary programs and inputs [6] . The conclusion is often paraphrased that the halting problem is undecidable.
Turing's proof uses reductio ad absurdum. A well-known simplified version takes the following three steps.
First, assume that there is a general algorithm that can solve the halting problem for any program p and input i. This means that there must be a Turing machine H that always halts for any p and i and computes the function
Second, one can easily derive from this machine another Turing machine H ′ whose behavior is modified to compute only diagonal components in the p-i space, i.e., h
This machine determines whether the program p halts when its self-description is given to it as an input. Such a self-reference would be meaningless for most of actual computer programs, but still theoretically possible. Then, finally, one can tweak H ′ slightly to make yet another machine H * that falls into an infinite loop if h
if it eventually halts on p(H * ).
Both lead to contradiction. Therefore, the assumption we initially made must be wrong-there must be no general algorithm to solve the halting problem.
TURING'S ORIGINAL PROOF
Here I would like to bring up an informative, yet relatively untold, fact that Turing himself did not like to have such a tricky mathematical treatment as the above third step that introduces a factitious logical inversion into the mechanism of the machine, so he intentionally avoided using it in his original proof. Below is a quote from his original paper [6, ⋆ A binary sequence whose n-th digit is a Boolean inverse of the n-th digit of the n-th computable sequence. If this sequence is computable, then it must be listed somewhere in the series of the computable sequences, which however causes a contradiction because its diagonal element must be both 0 and 1. Therefore this sequence cannot be computable.
† Description Number: An integer that describes the specifics of a given computational machine. ‡ Note that this is different from H we used in the previous section. Turing used H for a machine that incrementally and indefinitely computes the diagonal sequence of the infinite matrix made of all the infinitely long computable sequences enumerated in the order of D.N's of corresponding machines. In this paragraph, Turing considered the actual behavior of intact H (in his notation) on its self-description K, and noticed that what this machine would need to compute is exactly the same situation as the machine itself is in: "H is looking at its self-description K." Such a self-reference would result in a circular process that never comes back. Therefore, H cannot make any decision on whether K is satisfactory or not. This contradiction negatively proves the possibility of D, or a general computational procedure to determine whether a machine stops writing symbols or not.
SELF-REPLICATION EMERGING
Turing's argument described above gives essentially the same argument as to what could happen if H ′ (in our notation) received its self-description p(H ′ ).
In this case H
and hence it would need to simulate the behavior of the machine described in (4), if "to simulate the behavior" is read as "to construct the structure". This similarity may be better understood by noting that the role of C that attaches I(X) to X, shown in the last line of Eq. (3), parallels the role of diagonalization in Eq. (6); both attempt to apply a copy of the description to the machine represented by the description.
|| A machine that is assumed capable of determining whether a given machine is circular or not. This machine is introduced to construct H.
Moreover, if one watched how the actual configuration of the tape of H ′ changes during such a self-simulating process, he would see that the information about H ′ actually self-replicates on the tape space, with its representation becoming more and more indirect as generation changes (Fig. 2) . Turing might have imagined this kind of replicating dynamics of machines when he developed his argument.
In view of the similarity between the above two processes, it can be clearly recognized that von Neumann's design of self-reproducing automata is by no means just an anomaly in construction theory. Rather, it correctly reflects the self-simulation chain of computationally universal machines that appears in the proof of the undecidability of the halting problem presented by Turing.
RELATED WORK
With the similarity between computation and construction kept in mind, it may sound rather trivial that universal construction comes with undecidable problems similar to those for universal computation. For example, if a universal constructor is also computationally universal (this is not always the case [7] ), then determining what the universal constructor eventually produces is equivalent to determining what a Turing machine eventually computes, and therefore it must be undecidable.
Something similar to the above undecidability was already argued by Cohen [16] , where he showed that there is no general algorithm for the detection of self-replicating computer viruses. The proof is rather simple: If there were an algorithm, say S, that can determine whether a given computer program is self-replicative, then one could easily create another contradictory program that has S built in it and self-replicates if and only if its S classifies the program itself as non-self-replicative. This is probably the best acknowledged discussion on the relationship between self-replication and the undecidable problem so far.
We should note, however, that Cohen's argument above suggests that detecting a computer program that does "X" is generally impossible, where "X" could be self-replication but also be replaced by any other functions; selfreplication is no more than just one of many possible behaviors of universal constructors. In contrast, our argument discussed in this paper is more fundamental: Universal construction comes with undecidable problems because of the existence of self-replication. Here self-replication is not just an instance of many possible behaviors, but is actually the key property that causes the undecidability of the behavior of universal machines, either computational or FIGURE 2 Self-replication of Turing machine H ′ on the tape space. Given its own description p(H ′ ), it starts an indefinite cascade of self-simulation, where the information about H ′ actually self-replicates on the tape. The representation becomes more and more indirect as time goes on. constructional.
CONCLUSION
As Turing showed in his proof, when a computational machine tries to solve the halting problem of its own computation process, it will fall into a cycle of self-simulation that never ends in a finite time. Our point is that this corresponds exactly to the cycle of self-replication in construction theory, and that von Neumann's self-reproducing automaton model rightly captures this feature in its formulation. The halting problem solver in construction theory lets the subject machine construct its product and see if it eventually stops. If it tries to solve the halting problem of its own construction process, it will start self-replication, and the entire process never completes in a finite amount of time.
The insight obtained in the above sections provides us with some new implications about the connections between computation and construction. Throughout our argument, we saw that the construction of another machine in construction theory had the same role and meaning of the simulation of another machine in computation theory. This correspondence transcends the second difference between computational and constructional machines we discussed in the Introduction, where I said:
The computational universality is defined by the ability of simulating the behavior of all the other computers, while the constructional universality is defined by the ability of constructing all the structures in a given product set, which has nothing to do with the ability of simulating the behavior of other constructors.
Interestingly, once construction and simulation are identified with each other, these two universalities become the same-the universal constructor indeed has the ability to simulate the behavior of all the other constructors by physically constructing them and letting them do their jobs. The idea of such "constructor-constructors" is relevant to the realization of machines with epigenetic dynamics, which will be one of the more important subjects in construction theory.
The simulation-construction correspondence also gives us a unique view of biology, suggesting that the relationship between parent and offspring in biological systems is equivalent to the relationship between the simulating H ′ and the simulated H ′ in computation theory. From a construction-theoretic perspective, a biological organism is trying to find out the final result of the construction task written in its genetic information by executing its contents. The final product will be immediately found if the product of the task is a static structure, such as drugs produced by genetically modified bacteria. But if the product is another active machine that will attempt to build other products, then the final result will depend on what this product will do next. Furthermore, if the product is identical (or sufficiently similar) to the original organism itself, the situation represents the conventional parent-offspring relationship, where offspring are a kind of intermediate products produced during the whole long-standing construction process. In this view, the endless chain of self-replication that living systems are in, may be reinterpreted as a parallel to the endless chain of self-simulation that a halting-problem solver falls in. In a sense, we may all be in the process initiated billions of years ago by a first universal constructor, who just tried to see the final product of its "diagonal" construction.
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